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The importance of importance in OCD memory research 
 
Investigations of memory and associated phenomena in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
can advance our understanding of this often debilitating problem.  Theoretical models predict 
both the presence and absence of memory biases in favour of threat-relevant information in 
association with anxiety disorders generally, and with OCD specifically.  Two previous 
experiments (one involving compulsive washing and another involving compulsive checking) 
that demonstrated such a memory bias are reviewed in the context of the existing literature.  
Additionally, a new experiment failing to demonstrate such a bias (in association with 
compulsive ordering and arranging) is presented.  The results are discussed in terms of 
cognitive-behavioural and information processing approaches to understanding OCD.  It is 
argued that experiments which utilize stimuli that are low in ecological validity are unlikely to 
detect explicit memory biases in OCD.  As such, experimental paradigms that are perceived as 




The importance of importance in OCD memory research 
 
 Specific references to memory and related processes have only recently been 
incorporated into models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Rachman, 2002).  However, 
investigations of these processes have provided valuable information about not only the 
phenomenology of OCD, but also the mechanisms on which information processing may have an 
impact.  This is of primary importance to OCD researchers as many believe that compulsions 
(particularly checking compulsions) result from memory impairments or memory deficits.  In 
fact, the nature of memory in OCD is much more complicated than this (Radomsky & Rachman, 
1999; Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, this issue). 
 Early models of the relationships between mood and information processing (e.g., Bower, 
1981) and psychopathology (Kovacs & Beck, 1978) predicted that strong attentional and 
memorial biases occur in favour of emotion-relevant information.  The proponents of these 
models contended that the connections between ideas or concepts would vary according to a 
person’s emotional state.  That is, in a specific emotional state, attentional, processing and 
memorial resources are hypothesized to be allocated preferentially to information that is relevant 
or significant to that emotional state.  We should therefore attend to, process and remember sad 
information when we are unhappy, threatening information when we are frightened, etc.  Indeed, 
both attentional biases in association with anxiety and memory biases in association with 
depression have been reliably demonstrated (see Williams, Watts & MacLeod, 1997 for a 
review).  These findings suggest that significant, important and relevant information receives 
preferential processing, and is consistent with fundamental cognitive models which propose that 
deeper levels of processing are associated with better attention and memory (Craik & Lockhart, 
 
 5
1972).  Furthermore, it is consistent with other fundamental cognitive research demonstrating 
that information perceived and encoded as self-referent or personally important is better 
remembered than other types of information (Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977).   
Unfortunately, findings of threat-relevant memory biases in association with anxiety 
and/or anxiety disorders have been and remain somewhat inconsistent (see a recent review by 
Coles & Heimberg, 2002).  Research of this kind becomes increasingly difficult when it is 
applied to OCD for reasons based in clinical psychology (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 
2001), cognitive psychology (Tallis, 1993) and neuropsychology (Greisberg & McKay, 2003; 
Savage, Deckersbach, Wilhelm, Rauch, Baer, Reid & Jenike, 2000; Woods, Vevea, Chambless, 
& Bayen, 2002). 
 Early negative findings of memory bias in association with anxiety disorders were 
difficult to reconcile with existing models (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990), and as such, newer models 
were developed to account for the well-supported presence of attentional biases associated with 
anxiety but the apparent absence of strong memorial biases.  These models generally fall under 
the description of cognitive avoidance models because they posit that while threatening 
information may indeed receive preferential attentional resources, further elaboration of this 
material is avoided because of its unpleasant nature (Mogg, Matthews, & Weinman, 1987).  This 
approach was intuitive in that threatening information is unpleasant and the model is consistent 
with other fundamental cognitive psychology research (i.e., Graf & Mandler, 1984), but not 
consistent with evidence from the clinic.  Many patients are able to describe relevant threatening 
events that occurred years earlier, in exquisite detail.  For example, OCD patients with an intense 




Our interpretation of these early negative research findings was that the lack of consistent 
evidence for memory bias in anxiety may have resulted from primarily methodological 
problems.  A significant majority of early research conducted on memory bias and anxiety used 
clinical samples of participants with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD).  It was our hypothesis 
that the series of ambiguous findings about memory bias in the anxiety disorders may have 
resulted from the use of participants without a specific circumscribed fear (a hallmark feature of 
GAD) and from the use of stimuli low in ecological validity (i.e., words).  This type of paradigm 
was applied to experimental investigations using participants with GAD (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, 
& White, 1995; Dalgleish, 1994; Mogg, Matthews, & Eysenck, 1992), with social phobia 
(Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, & Rodney, 1994), and slightly more successfully to 
participants diagnosed with panic disorder (Cloitre & Leibowitz, 1991; Cloitre, Shear, 
Cancienne, & Zeitlin, 1994; McNally, Foa, & Donell, 1989; Nunn, Stevenson, & Whalan, 1984).  
Not surprisingly, an excellent study by Constans, Foa, Franklin, and Matthews (1995) 
investigated memory in association with OCD using ecologically valid stimuli and found a 
significant memory bias in favour of threat-relevant information.  In this study, the compulsive 
checkers had a better memory for the last completed action (most of which were checking-
related and/or threat-relevant) in the experimental procedure.  We then began to design and 
conduct experiments in which we recruited participants who reported specific feared outcomes 
and tested them in paradigms that included ecologically valid stimuli (objects) and provocations 
that conveyed a real perceived possibility of threat or harm (contamination, uncertainty about 
future harm, etc.).  These initial investigations were successful at using stimuli and conditions 
which were likely perceived as significant and important by participants with OCD. 
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We decided to first investigate the possibility of detecting a memory bias in association 
with a fear of contamination in OCD because these fears tend to be intense, we felt that 
contamination could be manipulated in a laboratory setting and because there were many models 
and theories (biological, psychological and neuropsychological) which could easily be applied to 
OCD.  For this experiment (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999), we recruited three groups of 
participants: an experimental group meeting the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for OCD (APA, 
1994) who reported that compulsive washing and/or a fear of contamination was their primary 
symptom, an anxious clinical control group meeting the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for other 
(non-OCD) anxiety disorders (in this case, mostly panic disorder and social phobia), and an 
undergraduate student control group.   
After a thorough assessment, participants were asked to watch as an experimenter 
touched a series of everyday objects with either a clean tissue or a ‘contaminated’ tissue.  After 
watching the experimenter contaminate 25 objects and touch, but not contaminate the other 25 in 
one of two random counterbalanced orderings, participants were administered the Wechsler 
Memory Scale, Revised (WMS-R, Wechsler, 1987) which served as both an assessment of 
general memory abilities and as a distractor task.  Following this, participants completed a free 
recall task in which they were asked to record as many objects from the table as they could 
remember, an approach test in which they were asked to state how anxious they would feel if 
they touched each of the objects on the table and a source recognition test in which they were 
asked to state which tissue (clean or contaminated) was used to touch each of the objects on the 
table (see Radomsky & Rachman, 1999 for a full description). 
Results indicated that while all groups remembered approximately the same number of 
items, only the OCD group remembered significantly more contaminated items than clean items.  
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Neither control group showed a bias in favour or against threatening information.  While overall, 
participants appeared to predict more anxiety in association with touching contaminated objects 
than clean objects, the OCD group reported significantly more anxiety about touching any 
object, likely due to a magical perceived spread of contamination over time (Rozin, Markwith, & 
Nemeroff, 1992; Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, & Sherrod, 1989; Tolin, Worhunsky, & Maltby, this 
issue).  During a recognition test, participants with OCD were slightly but not significantly more 
able to remember the source (contaminated or not contaminated) of each object than controls, 
however this may have been due to the low power of the study given its small sample sizes.  
Finally, there were no differences between any of the three groups on any of the WMS-R total 
scores or subscale scores.   
These results indicated that participants with OCD had a positive memory bias in favour 
of threatening information, information which was perceived as significant and important to 
them.  In fact, during debriefing from the study, one of the OCD participants reported that he had 
recently attended a business meeting during which there was a red spot on the wall.  He said that 
he wasn’t sure if it was jam or blood, but proceeded to describe the spot in exacting detail.  
When asked about the meeting itself, he could not recall what it had been about.  This report is 
completely consistent with a positive memory bias in favour of threatening information 
associated with compulsive washing.   
While there was only a trend in favour of threat recognition in our study, a recent 
replication of the study by Ceschi, Van der Linden, Dunker, Perroud and Brédart (2003) found a 
significant threat-relevant recognition bias, only in their OCD washing group.  Interestingly, this 
study failed to replicate the free recall memory bias reported in Radomsky & Rachman (1999), 
suggesting that further replication may be desirable.  However, Ceschi et al.’s (2003) failure to 
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replicate our earlier findings may have been due to the fact that all of their clinical participants 
were receiving treatment for their OCD at the time of the study, whereas the majority of 
participants in our sample began treatment only after completing the experiment.  Participants 
who had successfully completed treatment would not be expected to show such a memory bias 
and those receiving treatment would likely show an attenuated bias.  Furthermore, participants in 
the European study were all tested in a hospital setting that was quite familiar to them (likely 
producing a lower perceived threat) whereas the North American study involved testing 
participants in a novel university department setting.  Additionally, due to the idiosyncratic 
nature of OCD, it is possible that participants who interpret the contamination as threatening will 
show a recognition bias whereas participants who interpret the objects as threatening will show a 
recall bias.  Finally, neither of the two studies included an assessment of the perceived 
contamination of the objects before testing, and it is possible that participants began the 
experiment with the perception that some objects were more contaminated than others.  Since 
different sets of objects were used in the two investigations, it is unclear whether this factor or 
any of the others mentioned above may have influenced recall, recognition, encoding and/or 
retrieval processes.  These are empirical questions and may benefit from further investigation. 
While these results, indicating a memory bias for threatening information in compulsive 
washers were encouraging, we felt that memory problems are much more likely to be associated 
with compulsive checking than with compulsive washing (Radomsky, Rachman & Hammond, 
2001).  Indeed, patients who wash compulsively don’t report that they engage in this compulsive 
behaviour because they can’t remember if they washed their hands properly; they tend to report 
that they feel an urge to wash because they no longer feel clean.  On the other hand, patients who 
engage in compulsive checking frequently report that their checking often follows an inability to 
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recall whether or not something has been properly checked, locked, turned off, etc.  As such, we 
sought to investigate memory biases in association with compulsive checking as an extension of 
the above experimental analysis of memory in association with compulsive washing. 
In a small study of memory in compulsive checkers who met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria 
for OCD (APA, 1994) and indicated that compulsive checking was their primary symptom, we 
went to participants’ homes.  Participants completed a thorough assessment, and, following a 
baseline check of an item in their home that would normally cause anxiety if left unchecked, 
additional checks were completed and videotaped under conditions of both high and low 
perceived responsibility (Radomsky et al., 2001).  Under the high responsibility condition, 
participants completed a responsibility contract stating that they took full and complete 
responsibility for the check and its outcome and agreed to assume complete and total liability for 
anything that might happen as a result of the check not being properly completed, and then 
proceeded to complete the check.  Under the low responsibility condition, the experimenter 
signed the contract assuming responsibility and subsequently proceeded to complete the check, 
attempting to match as closely as possible the baseline check completed earlier.  (Participants 
rated the experimenter’s checks as nearly identical to their own.)  Following each check, we 
administered a Memory and Confidence Interview that was designed to test for memory 
accuracy and confidence for both threat-relevant information (i.e., “How many times did you 
touch the knob on the stove?”) and threat-irrelevant information (i.e., “What was the colour of 
the pen on the experimenter’s collar?”).  All participants completed one high responsibility 
check and one low responsibility check, and the order of these was counterbalanced across 
participants.  One week later, participants came to the lab, watched the videotaped checks that 
were made in their homes (which were defined as ‘no responsibility’ checks because they had 
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already occurred in the past, and because the videotapes were not depicting activities that could 
produce any current or future harm) and again completed Memory and Confidence Interviews 
about these taped checks. 
Results indicated that a memory bias was present in favour of threat-relevant information 
and that this bias was amplified under conditions of high responsibility.  That is, for both of the 
in-home checks, participants remembered significantly more threat-relevant information than 
threat-irrelevant information, although this difference was greater for the high responsibility 
check than for the low responsibility check.  Under conditions of ‘no responsibility’, this bias 
was undetectable.  Interestingly, when we analysed the data from the confidence portion of the 
interviews, we found that as perceived responsibility increased, confidence in memory 
decreased.  That is, confidence in memory was significantly greater under conditions of low or 
no responsibility than under conditions of high responsibility.  This finding was consistent with 
other research on repetition and memory in OCD (Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, Amir, Street, & 
Foa, 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 2003, this issue), showing that repetition of compulsive or 
related actions can lead to decreases in aspects of metamemory while leaving memory accuracy 
(especially for threat-relevant memory) intact.  Again, we found evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that significant and important information is better remembered than other 
information. 
One of the clinical experimental group participants excluded from the Radomsky & 
Rachman (1999) study was someone who did not have a fear of contamination but who instead 
ordered and arranged many of her belongings at home.  This participant was run through the 
experimental protocol accidentally (only compulsive washers were to be included in the 
experimental group - and a diagnosis of OCD was an exclusionary criteria for both control 
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groups).  During the recall task, this participant reported that she had probably recalled all of the 
objects that were “not put right” on the table “because they stood out - like they needed to be 
moved a bit”, and had trouble recalling the objects that had been ‘properly placed’.  This 
excluded participant was the inspiration for the current study. 
 Just as memory biases in favour of threatening information have been demonstrated in 
our previous work with compulsive washers (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999) and compulsive 
checkers (Radomsky et al., 2001), we sought to investigate this bias in association with another 
OCD subtype, namely compulsive ordering and arranging.  One would expect that compulsive 
orderers and arrangers will have a biased recall for objects which are out of place or disorderly 
as these are likely perceived as significant, important and relevant to their concerns.  An 
experimental analysis of compulsive ordering and arranging that was already underway 
(Radomsky & Rachman, in press) provided an excellent opportunity to test for the presence of 
this bias in association with this type of compulsive behaviour. 
 
Aim:  The aim of this experiment was to test for the presence of a memory bias for threat-
relevant information (disorderliness) among people who feel compelled to keep their 
surroundings orderly and arranged. 
 
Predictions: 
1. Participants who score highly on the Symmetry, Ordering and Arranging Questionnaire 
(SOAQ – Radomsky & Rachman, in press), or high orderers and arrangers will remember 
more threat-relevant information (groups of objects that were disordered) than threat-
irrelevant information (groups of objects that were well ordered and arranged). 
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2. Participants who score low on the SOAQ will not demonstrate this bias and will recall 
similar amounts of threat-relevant and threat-irrelevant information. 
 
Method 
 Participants were selected for this experiment from a questionnaire package that was 
distributed to university undergraduate students.  The package included the Symmetry, Ordering 
and Arranging Questionnaire (SOAQ – Radomsky & Rachman, in press), the Beck Depression 
Inventory, Second Edition (BDI – Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1996), the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
(BAI – Beck & Steer, 1990), the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (VOCI – 
Thordarson et al., in press), and the Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SPAI – Turner, Beidel 
& Dancu, 1996).  Twenty-four participants with SOAQ scores greater than 0.5 standard 
deviations above the normative mean were assigned to the High SOAQ group, and twenty-four 
participants with SOAQ scores lower than 0.5 standard deviations below the normative mean 
were assigned to the Low SOAQ group. 
 After completion of the questionnaire package, participants were told to prepare a small 
5-minute speech about a topic of their choice, which was to be presented to a panel of three 
University faculty members.  Participants were informed that their speech was to be graded on 
both its content and delivery/style.  They were told that because this task often produces some 
anxiety, they would be given a few minutes and a space in which to prepare their speech.   
 Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions.  In the ‘organized 
workspace’ condition, participants were taken to a desk in a room which had been neatly ordered 
and arranged.  In the ‘disorganized workspace’ condition, participants were taken to a desk in a 
room which had been disordered in a standardized manner.  Two experimenters verified that the 
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desk was in the appropriate ordered or disordered state.  Regardless of the condition to which the 
participant was assigned, there were four groups of objects on the windowsill in front of the 
desk.  Two were organized (e.g., books arranged by height, crayons sorted in box by colour) and 
two were disorganized (e.g., books piled randomly, crayons in random pile out of box).   
After 3 minutes of preparation time, the experimenter took the participant away from the 
workspace and asked each participant to write a list of all objects that were on the windowsill in 
front of the desk in the room in which the speech was prepared.  Participants were given 2 
minutes to complete this task. 
 
Participants 
 The 48 participants in this study had a mean age of 21.7 (SD=5.5) years.  79.2% of 
participants were female.  Other participant characteristics are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Results 
 Recall scores for organized items and disorganized items, from Low SOAQ and High 
SOAQ participants in the organized workspace and disorganized workspace conditions are 
displayed in Figure 1.  Out of a possible total recall score of 4, no single participant achieved a 
score greater than 1.  A 2 (group) by 2 (room condition) by 2 (type of object) MANOVA was 
conducted on these data.  Despite the fact that high SOAQ participants were made significantly 
more anxious by having to prepare the speech in a disorganized workspace (see Radomsky & 
Rachman, 2003 for a complete analysis of non-memorial data obtained in this protocol), no 
significant memory effects were found (all F’s < 1).  Furthermore, no single memory score was 





 The memory results of the current study did not confirm our hypotheses.  High SOAQ 
participants did not recall more disordered groups of items than groups of ordered items.  In fact, 
participants did not recall many groups of items at all.  While this may simply be the result of 
floor effects (e.g., the task was too difficult), it is more likely because of the design of this 
particular experiment.  At least two studies have confirmed that if ecologically valid stimuli are 
used that are perceived as personally threatening, a memory bias in OCD is strong and detectable 
using a free recall test (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky at al., 2001) and a third study 
found the same bias using a recognition test (Ceschi et al., 2003).  The current experiment 
probably had a greater effect on attention than it did on memory, and hence the result was null.  
That is, the paradigm may have directed attention away from critical and personally significant 
information (the state of the objects in the room) and toward the speech preparation task, thus 
blocking the expected biased access to threat-relevant information.  This is consistent with 
research by Mathews & Sebastien (1993) who found that a threat-relevant attentional bias was 
suppressed in the presence of distracting surroundings.  Additionally, it is unlikely that 
participants perceived any responsibility for the state of the room.  It has been proposed that in 
social anxiety disorder (or social phobia), anxiety provocations result in self-focused attention 
(Mansell, Clark & Ehlers, 2003; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Woody, 1996).  Asking participants 
to prepare a speech is a common provocation associated with investigations of social anxiety.  
Even though the current study had stimuli and even a workspace that would be appropriate to 
test for phenomena associated with compulsive ordering and arranging, it is quite likely that the 
provocation used directed participants’ attention inward and away from their external 
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environment, leading to very poor memory about their surroundings at the later recall test.  
Furthermore, if participants were left with no sense of responsibility for the state of the room, it 
is likely that the state of the room was perceived as less significant and less important in this 
paradigm.  Using an alternate provocation, (e.g., asking participants to tidy up the desk, 
increasing their perceived sense of responsibility) might have enabled better encoding and 
subsequent testing of both recall and recognition memory associated with this subtype of OCD.  
It might also be fruitful to consider a provocation in which a room is only slightly disordered 
(e.g., a very tidy desk with a plant tipped over in one corner) as a means of examining the 
sensitivity of participants to the degree of disorder in their surroundings and its subsequent 
effects on information processing and emotional arousal.  This illustrates the importance of 
designing an experimental paradigm which contains not only relevant stimuli and surroundings 
but that also contains a provocation that is significant to the construct being assessed.  In order to 
maximize the match between task and stimuli, it is recommended that the meaning of the task be 
related to the function of the cognitive bias under investigation.  In essence, it is proposed that 
the meaning of the task is just as important as the meaning of the stimuli.   
 Of course, it is also possible that the recall task was simply too difficult, in which case, a 
recognition test of memory could have been used.  However, in a study with only four groups of 
objects to be remembered, a recognition test is quite likely to produce ceiling effects.  In our 
previous work with memory in OCD, recall tests were sufficient to detect effects that were quite 
strong (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001).  Attempts at replication (Ceschi et 
al., 2003; Tolin et al., 2001) have produced mixed results although generally support the idea 
that OCD participants tend to have better attentional, processing and memorial resources 
available for information which is threat-relevant, significant and perceived as important.  This 
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finding is consistent with early cognitive (Bower, 1981) and clinical (Kovacs & Beck, 1978) 
models of emotional arousal and memory, although there are several predictable obstacles that 
will likely make further investigations of memory in OCD quite challenging. 
 One of the most prominent obstacles to overcome in this area is related to the 
complicated interplay between memory accuracy and metamemory.  If a person has a strong 
metamemory for an object or an event (as demonstrated by high confidence in memory, high 
vividness in memory, high detail in memory, etc.), it is fairly easily to detect whether or not this 
person has an accurate memory for that object or event.  They should know whether or not they 
remember it.  If however, the person has a weak metamemory (low confidence, vividness, detail, 
etc., in memory), it can be exceedingly difficult to determine their memory accuracy because the 
doubt and uncertainty can lead a person to state that they can’t recall something when in fact, 
they may have recalled it correctly.  They may remember it without really knowing that they 
have.  This distinction is similar to the constructs of remembering and knowing outlined by 
Tulving (1985), and requires attention in experimental investigations of memory in OCD.  We 
attempted to address this complication in our investigation of memory in compulsive checking 
(Radomsky at al., 2001) by explaining to participants the distinctions between accuracy and 
confidence in memory before the study began.  We gave examples of accurate memories about 
which a person can feel very confident; accurate memories that a person can have with very low 
confidence; inaccurate memories that a person can (incorrectly) feel very confident about; and 
inaccurate memories that a person can have with very low confidence.  Participants were 
encouraged to report their answers to the memory part of the interview regardless of their 
confidence in these answers and then to provide confidence ratings afterwards.  This may have 
helped to disentangle these two constructs in that particular study and the lack of this kind of 
 
 18
psychoeducation in other studies could be partly responsible for weak or negative findings.  
Investigations of both explicit and implicit memory will also likely help to elucidate some of the 
factors that distinguish between memory accuracy and memory confidence.  Participants who 
strongly doubt their memory are probably much less likely to report these memories than 
participants without this pathological doubt.  Since uncertainty and doubt are hallmark features 
of OCD (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980), this must be taken into account in any investigation of 
memory accuracy in this population.   
 A central recent finding related to metamemory in OCD is also related to the effects of 
repeated checking.  An exceptional set of studies by van den Hout and Kindt (this issue) found 
that repeated relevant checking produces significant reductions in memory confidence, vividness 
and detail when compared with repeated irrelevant checking.  Interestingly, despite these 
reductions in metamemory, memory accuracy was relatively unimpaired by this repetition.  As 
such, any investigation which includes repetition (e.g., Tolin et al., 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003) may be producing decrements in metamemory which could cloud participants’ responses 
to explicit memory questions.  Unfortunately, it may be extremely difficult to capitalize on the 
ecological validity of repeated checking in this way without compromising the impact of poor 
metamemory on actual memory performance.  While some investigations have done this 
successfully (Radomsky at al., 2001; Tolin et al., 2001; van den Hout & Kindt, this issue), this 
challenge cannot be neglected when reporting memory effects following task repetition in OCD. 
 Other factors to be considered when investigating memory phenomena in OCD include 
the idiosyncratic nature of OCD and the widely varying interpretations of stimuli and 
provocations that participants can make.  For example, a doorknob can be threatening to an 
individual with OCD because it might appear unlocked, or because it might appear unclean.  
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Furthermore, some kinds of contamination may be threatening to one person who engages in 
compulsive washing while they might be completely benign to another.  This has been addressed 
in a number of ways including the use of an ambiguous contaminant (Radomsky & Rachman, 
1999), participant selection of threatening and non-threatening stimuli (Tolin et al., 2001), and 
home visits (Radomsky et al., 2001).  It is likely that other paradigms and methodologies can be 
employed to address this aspect of the disorder, but careful piloting is recommended to ensure 
that an experimental paradigm successfully captures the essence of the features to be 
investigated. 
 One possible way for investigators to increase ecological validity and maintain a solid 
connection between the perceived importance of the experimental paradigm and stimuli and the 
beliefs and interpretations of the participants would be to take advantage of some of the newer 
theoretical approaches to understanding the cognitive and behavioural features of OCD.  While 
earlier models of OCD provided a broad description of important psychological features in OCD 
such as the concept of inflated responsibility (Salkovskis, 1985), newer models have been 
successful at elucidating some of the more subtle aspects associated with specific manifestations 
of OCD such as compulsive hoarding (Frost & Hartl, 1996), obsessions (Rachman, 1997, 1998), 
and compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002).  Furthermore, advances in our understanding of 
beliefs in OCD have produced specific domains (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group, 1997, 2001, in press) that could well be useful for integration into investigations of 
memory in OCD.  The use of current theories and constructs can help to provide ideal paradigms 
and stimuli by matching and grouping the constructs of theoretical models with the symptoms, 




We propose that when these general conditions are met, empirical findings will support 
the hypothesis that people with OCD tend to remember information that is perceived to be 
significant, threat-relevant and important (specific recommendations are listed below).  This 
hypothesis is adaptive in nature (remembering this kind of information is probably adaptive) and 
consistent with current theories.  Failure to conduct experimental investigations that 
accommodate these issues will likely perpetuate the ambiguous state of the literature on memory 
in OCD specifically and, more generally on memory and attention in mood and anxiety 
disorders. 
Future research 
 In light of the findings so far, some improvements in approach are needed.  We propose 
several suggestions for increasing the magnification of memory biases in anxiety and OCD, in 
order better to comprehend this phenomenon.  In essence, there are two ways to conceptualize 
predicted memory biases in anxiety.  The first is a mood dependant memory bias, in which 
memory should be enhanced by provoking the same mood state at retrieval as was experienced at 
encoding (see Eich, 1995) and the second is a mood congruent bias, in which memory should be 
enhanced for information that is consistent with a person’s mood (see Gilligan & Bower, 1983).  
That is, mood dependant biases should be detectable if participants are equally anxious when 
they attempt to remember the information as they were when they learned it, and mood 
congruent biases should be detectable if the information to be remembered is perceived as 
significant, important and threatening.  While both models make similar predictions, their 
implications for methodology will be somewhat different. 
 Firstly, it is essential to ensure the efficacy of the experimental manipulation – the 
participants in the key group must report either high levels of anxiety at encoding and retrieval 
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(while control groups must not), or they must report that threatening items are indeed perceived 
as threatening and anxiety provoking (while control groups must not).  Secondly, the items in the 
memory task must be ecologically valid, perceived as important and significant, and used in 
preference to degraded or remote cues (such as those used in a Stroop-like paradigm).  Thirdly, 
the number of items used in the task must allow for sufficient error in either direction and ideally 
should result in overall recall rates of approximately 50%.  Fourthly, especially for investigations 
of memory bias in association with contamination fears, care needs to be taken to avoid “cross 
contamination” or the spread of threat from one set of items to another, or in the case of mood 
dependent memory, the spread of perceived threat from one testing setting to another.  Fifthly, it 
is essential to measure the perceived threat associated with items before any experimental 
manipulations of their threat value (or of mood state) occur.  Finally, both recall and recognition 
memory must be assessed. 
 Research into memory and related processes in OCD is important.  Furthermore, it is 
essential that the paradigms employed capture what is critically important to the individuals with 
OCD being tested.  The importance of importance in OCD memory research should not be 
underestimated.  A combination of these refined methods should enhance the probability of 
obtaining clear and strong results, and hopefully lead to definitive conclusions about memory 
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Table 1 – Participant characteristics 
 





















































Low SOAQ High SOAQ
Organized room -
Organized items
Organized room -
Disorganized items
Disorganized room -
Organized items
Disorganized room -
Disorganized items
 
 
 
